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AbstrACt
Objective We estimated the effect of an employer- 
sponsored health insurance (ESHI) scheme on healthcare 
utilisation of medically trained providers and reduction 
of out- of- pocket (OOP) expenditure among ready- made 
garment (RMG) workers.
Design We used a case–control study design with cross- 
sectional preintervention and postintervention surveys.
settings The study was conducted among workers of 
seven purposively selected RMG factories in Shafipur, 
Gazipur in Bangladesh.
Participants In total, 1924 RMG workers (480 from the 
insured and 482 from the uninsured, in each period) were 
surveyed from insured and uninsured RMG factories, 
respectively, in the preintervention (October 2013) and 
postintervention (April 2015) period.
Interventions We tested the effect of a pilot ESHI scheme 
which was implemented for 1 year.
Outcome measures The outcome measures were 
utilisation of medically trained providers and reduction 
of OOP expenditure among RMG workers. We estimated 
difference- in- difference (DiD) and applied two- part 
regression model to measure the association between 
healthcare utilisation, OOP payments and ESHI scheme 
membership while controlling for the socioeconomic 
characteristics of workers.
results The ESHI scheme increased healthcare utilisation 
of medically trained providers by 26.1% (DiD=26.1; 
p<0.01) among insured workers compared with uninsured 
workers. While accounting for covariates, the effect on 
utilisation significantly reduced to 18.4% (p<0.05). The 
DiD estimate showed that OOP expenditure among insured 
workers decreased by −3700 Bangladeshi taka and -1100 
Bangladeshi taka compared with uninsured workers when 
using healthcare services from medically trained providers 
or all provider respectively, although not significant. The 
multiple two- part models also reported similar results.
Conclusion The ESHI scheme significantly increased 
utilisation of medically trained providers among RMG 
workers. However, it has no significant effect on OOP 
expenditure. It can be recommended that an educational 
intervention be provided to RMG workers to improve 
their healthcare- seeking behaviours and increase their 
utilisation of ESHI- designated healthcare providers while 
keeping OOP payments low.
bACkgrOunD
In Bangladesh, 67.0% of the total healthcare 
expenditure is borne by households through 
out- of- pocket (OOP) payments.1 Due to such 
payments, 15.6% of households face cata-
strophic health expenditure (CHE), and 
almost five million people fall into poverty 
every year.2–4 Further, among those who seek 
healthcare, about 41.6% use services from 
informal (village doctor, drug sellers) and 
traditional providers, as well as faith- based 
healers,5 which results in overutilisation of 
drugs and adverse effects of treatment in 
many cases.6–9
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► The difference- in- difference estimate was used to 
evaluate the effect of employer- sponsored health 
insurance (ESHI) scheme on healthcare utilisation of 
medically trained healthcare providers and out- of- 
pocket (OOP) payments.
 ► A two- part model was employed to measure the as-
sociation between OOP payments and ESHI scheme 
enrolment while controlling for the socioeconomic 
characteristics of workers.
 ► The self- reported information on healthcare utili-
sation and OOP payments might be influenced by 
recall bias.
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box 1 Employer- sponsored health insurance (EsHI) 
scheme
Description of the EsHI scheme.
target population: workers of the garment industry.
Implementation organisation (third- party payment mechanism):
1. Diabetic Association of Bangladesh (health service provider).
2. United Insurance Company (insurance company).
3. The New Asia Group (garments factory).
benefit package:
1. Inpatient and outpatient treatment covered by the insurance scheme 
with a maximum coverage of 15 000 BDT (US$192.8*) per year.
Premium: 487 BDT (US$6.3) per year, which is borne by the employer.
number of enrollees: 8000 RMG workers from seven garment factories.
*US$1 = 77.8 Bangladeshi taka (BDT).53
ESHI, employer- sponsored health insurance; RMG, ready- made garment.
In order to achieve the Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC), the WHO urged its member states ‘to ensure that 
health- financing systems included a method for prepay-
ment of financial contributions for healthcare, with a view 
to sharing risk among the population and avoiding CHE 
and impoverishment of individuals as a result of seeking 
care’.10 In response to this urgent mission, the govern-
ment of Bangladesh developed the first- ever Health Care 
Financing Strategy 2012-2032 for the country in 2012.11 
This strategy proposed three different prepayment mech-
anisms to secure healthcare for all populations consid-
ering their involvement in economic sectors, namely 
formal sector workers and their dependents (18.8 million 
or 12.3%); informal sector workers and their depen-
dents (85.7 million or 56.2%); and the below poverty line 
population (48 million or 31.5%).11 The mechanisms for 
financing healthcare include the design and implemen-
tation of social health protection scheme for the below 
poverty line population as well as informal workers. It also 
includes the strengthening of financing and provision of 
public health services.11
The ready- made garment (RMG) sector, with 4.2 million 
workers, has emerged as one of the largest employer 
pools and foreign currency earners of Bangladesh. This 
sector has a large contribution to the economy of over 
US$34.13 billion export (more than 84% of all exports) 
per financial year.12 In spite of their large contribution to 
the economy, the workers are not receiving enough social 
protection, especially investment in health and education 
for their children. RMG workers are more vulnerable to 
suffer from many kinds of occupational illness compared 
to formal workers.13 14 A study revealed that diarrhoea, 
cough and breathlessness were predominant symptoms 
among 38%, 29% and 28% of RMG workers, respectively. 
Such workers have limited access to quality healthcare, 
as observed that about 11% of RMG workers did not 
receive any treatment for their illness. The majority of 
RMG workers consult with local medical assistant family 
planning (56%) for their illness, followed by drug sellers 
(21%) and traditional healers (10%).15 Another study on 
300 RMG workers showed that they did not get required 
vaccine, health education or workplace health- related 
knowledge from the garment factories.16 There was no 
provision of healthcare centres, doctors, medicine and 
treatment for fire burn and chronic illness both for them-
selves and for their family. More than half (63%) of the 
respondents reported working day lost due to illness.16
To ensure access to quality healthcare and financial 
risk protection for organised workers, industry- based 
‘Employer- Sponsored Health Insurance’ (ESHI) has been 
used in developed countries and recommended for devel-
oping countries.17 18 Such insurance schemes are usually 
offered by an organisation as part of workers’ benefits 
and compensation package. Considering the inadequate 
accessibility of RMG workers to healthcare, Bangladesh 
Diabetic Samiti (BADAS), a diabetic association in Bangla-
desh established in 1956, implemented a research- based 
pilot ESHI scheme (box 1) from March 2014 to February 
2015. United Insurance Company (UIC), Telemedicine 
Reference Center Ltd (TRCL) and the New Asia Group 
(RMG factories) collaborated in the pilot study.
It should be noted that some diseases and health 
conditions were excluded mostly due to the high and 
unaffordable costs of services. Such services comprised 
any congenital infirmity, radiotherapy (X- ray, radium or 
radioactive isotopes treatment), chemotherapy or any 
form of treatment when not incidental or necessary for 
treatment of the injury/illness which caused the hospi-
talisation, any dental treatment unless it requires hospi-
talisation for reconstructive surgery as a consequence of 
an accident, and special procedures (transplant, cardiac 
surgery, neurosurgery, phaco surgery, dialysis, HIV/AIDS 
and so on).
The ESHI scheme offered mandatory health insurance 
for workers of six garment factories of the New Asia Group 
(Knit- Asia, Ashulia; Knit- Asia, Shafipur; Knit- Asia, Nichin-
tapur; Malek Spinning Mills; Salek Textile; and Rahim 
Textile Mills) located at Shafipur in Gazipur, Bangladesh. 
A total of 8000 workers and supervisors were the benefi-
ciaries of the insurance scheme. We included all of these 
RMG factories in our evaluation study. It means that no 
other RMG factories had insurance scheme in that loca-
tion to our knowledge. It, however, should be noted that a 
large number of RMG factories are located in the Gazipur 
district of Bangladesh. Therefore, the generalisability of 
the study findings should not be remarkably affected by 
selection of these factories only from the Gazipur district. 
Health services were provided by a newly built hospital 
by BADAS in Shafipur, located close to the RMG facto-
ries. BADAS is one of the largest healthcare chains in 
Bangladesh after the public sector. It has grown into a 
nationwide organisation having 80 healthcare centres 
and educational facilities spread all over the country.19 
For the pilot phase one newly built hospital of BADAS 
was contracted by the insurance company. The pilot 
scheme provided coverage for treatment with a cost of 
up to 15 000 Bangladeshi taka (BDT) or US$192.8 annu-
ally. The premium for enrolment in the scheme was 487 
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BDT (US$6.3) per year, which was borne by the employer. 
BADAS and UIC have been experimenting with the ESHI 
scheme on a limited scale and sought a mechanism for 
scaling up and technical support to conduct that process 
in a professional way. The approach was to develop a scal-
able, ESHI scheme funded by the RMG factories through 
premium payment. The scheme was linked with the 
existing health service providers and insurance provider 
to create a sustainable and scalable health financing 
model. The premium was set through an actuarial anal-
ysis conducted by a hired firm. The benefit package was 
developed through expert consultation on the healthcare 
needs of RMG workers.
This ESHI scheme was piloted with the aim of providing 
quality healthcare with financial protection in the long 
term to RMG workers in Bangladesh. The objective of 
this study was thus to assess the effect of this insurance 
scheme on utilisation of healthcare services from medi-
cally trained providers (MTPs) and on the reduction of 
OOP healthcare expenditure for such care.
MEtHODs
We used a case–control study design with cross- sectional 
preintervention and postintervention surveys to assess 
healthcare utilisation of MTPs. Study participants were 
RMG workers from the insured group (IG) and unin-
sured group (UG). IG comprised workers from the six 
purposively selected RMG factories that offered ESHI. UG 
comprised workers from one purposively selected RMG 
factory without any ESHI scheme, namely JM Fabrics. 
All factories were located in the same area. Surveys were 
conducted before and after implementation of the ESHI 
scheme among workers in both IG and UG.
sample size
We estimated the sample size using the technique 
proposed by Casagrande et al20 and Ury and Fleiss21 for 
comparing two independent proportions. A study on 
micro- health insurance showed that the healthcare util-
isation of insured and uninsured individuals was 7.6% 
and 6.2%, respectively.22 Using these healthcare utilisa-
tion rates for two groups at a 10% error level and 85% 
statistical power, the estimated sample size for each 
group was 372. We considered 30% non- response rate in 
the sample size calculation due to high job switch rate 
among garment workers. Therefore, the sample size was 
increased to 484 for each group to maintain the desired 
statistical power. Finally, 962 RMG workers (480 from IG 
and 482 from UG) were included in both the preinter-
vention and postintervention period. Workers who had 
been working in the selected RMG factories for 6 months 
prior to the surveys were considered eligible for participa-
tion in the survey.
Data collection
A complete list of workers was collected from each 
selected factory. The list contained worker identification 
number, name, job position, age and sex. Using simple 
random sampling approach, the required number of 
samples was selected from that list. The selected partici-
pants were informed about the survey on the day before 
the survey. The management staff ensured the presence 
of the RMG workers during the survey to reduce non- 
response rate. A structured questionnaire was developed, 
and necessary modifications and corrections were made 
through field test before finalising. Data from individual 
workers were collected through face- to- face interviews. 
The interviews took place in a separate room close to the 
working place of the workers to ensure confidentiality. 
To avoid any bias in response by factory managers, none 
of them was allowed to accompany the worker during 
the survey. Twenty trained field research assistants were 
involved in conducting the survey, and four supervisors 
supervised and coordinated the data collection process. 
The preintervention data collection was performed from 
October 2013 to March 2014, and the postintervention 
data collection was from March to April 2015. The prein-
tervention survey took a long time due to an interruption 
caused by a political and labour unrest in the country.23
The demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
along with illness and related healthcare- seeking infor-
mation for the past 90 days (prior to interview) of RMG 
workers were collected. The type of healthcare providers 
used and the associated OOP healthcare expenditure 
information, for example, consultation, hospital bed, 
medicine, diagnosis, and transportation, were collected.
Variables
In this study, healthcare utilisation of MTPs and related 
OOP expenditure were the main outcome variables. The 
enrolment in the ESHI scheme was the main explana-
tory variable of interest. For adjustment of confounding, 
a number of demographic characteristics (eg, age, sex, 
marital status and education), socioeconomic charac-
teristics (eg, household income), employment level and 
type of illness suffered (eg, chronic illness) were used. 
Generally, RMG workers sought healthcare from both 
MTPs (eg, doctors, private clinics, medical colleges and 
district hospitals, subdistrict health complexes, factory 
doctors and non- governmental organisation clinics) and 
medically non- trained providers (eg, village doctors, drug 
sellers, traditional healers).15 OOP healthcare expendi-
ture includes medical fees or user fees for public care, 
medicines expenditure (whether prescribed or not), 
insurance copayments, and expenditure for transporta-
tion, diagnostic tests, hospital beds and food.3
Data analysis
We estimated the proportion of healthcare utilisation and 
average of OOP healthcare expenditure, along with their 
corresponding 95% confidence interval (CI), of RMG 
workers in IG and UG. Effects of the ESHI scheme on 
healthcare utilisation of MTPs and the reduction of OOP 
payments were estimated using difference- in- difference 
(DiD) estimates and a two- part regression model. Data 
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cleaning, validation and all statistical analyses were 
performed using STATA V.13.0 software.24
Difference-in-difference
The DiD method was employed to estimate the observed 
changes in the outcome variables for ESHI scheme 
enrollees. The outcomes of the scheme were reflected on 
differences and changes over time (preimplementation 
and postimplementation) and between the study groups 
(IG and UG) in terms of illness or symptoms, inpatient 
care, utilisation of MTPs and OOP healthcare expendi-
ture. It implies that the estimate of the counterfactual was 
obtained by computing the changes in outcomes for the 
UG. This counterfactual change is then subtracted from 
the change in outcomes for the IG.25 DiD statistics were 
estimated using a regression model,26 where two dummy 
variables, Si (1=IG, 0=UG) and Ti (1=postintervention 
and 0=preintervention), were created and entered into 
a regression model with the outcome variable (Yi). The 
regression model was specified as follows:
 Yi = β0 + β1Ti + β2Si + β3(T× S)it + ϵi (1)
The estimated regression coefficient β3 in equation 1 
represents the DiD statistics of the outcome variable.
While accounting for covariates for utilisation of health-
care, a separate model was used considering a number of 
control variables (eg, age, sex, education, marital status, 
income, job position and type of illness suffered) were 
included in multiple regression models for an adjusted 
estimate of DiD. The multiple regression model was spec-
ified as follows:
 
Yi = β0 + β1T1 + β2Si + β3(T× S)it+
β4κ1it + β5κ2it + . . . + ϵi  
(2)
where β0 was the constant, T was the study period, S 
was the study group, X1it, X2it,… were the control variables 
(eg, age, sex, marital status, education, occupation, and 
income), and β4, β5 were the associated coefficients. β3 was 
the DiD estimate while accounting for covariates.
two-part model
Since it was observed in the data that many individuals 
did not utilise any healthcare service during the inter-
vention period, reporting of zero OOP expenditure was 
quite common. Therefore, participation in expenditure 
and the magnitude of OOP healthcare expenditure may 
not be statistically independent.27 Application of an ordi-
nary least square approach to estimate the coefficient of 
the regression model to only among who spent for health-
care raises the possibility of sample selection bias.28 To 
avoid this problem, we included both individuals’ deci-
sion to participate in expenditure and the magnitude of 
OOP healthcare expenditure into the regression model 
adopting a two- part regression model. The two- part model 
allows assessment of the relationship between the partic-
ipation decision and the magnitude of OOP healthcare 
expenditure while controlling for covariates (eg, socio-
economic and demographic characteristics).29 30 In this 
model, the first part involves a decision about whether or 
not to participate in healthcare expenditure using probit 
function, and the second part determines the level of 
healthcare expenditure through a regression model.31 32 
Thus, the two- part model uses the information on both 
the probability and the magnitude of expenditure simulta-
neously in assessing predictors of OOP healthcare expen-
diture. The dependent variable for the probit model is a 
dichotomous variable that indicates whether OOP health-
care expenditure incurred (the participation decision). 
The regression model analysed the natural logarithm of 
OOP payments as a function of the covariates. The two- 
part regression modelwas specified as follows32:
 y
∗
i = β1X1i + β2X2i + β3X3i + . . . + εi; εi ∼ IN
(
0,σ2
)
...
(
3
)
 
Observed OOP payments are assumed to be related to 
a latent value as below:
 
yi =
yi, ifyi > 00, otherwise (4)
where Yi denotes the OOP healthcare expenditure and 
X1i represents the participation in ESHI scheme and X2i, 
X3i,… other control variables (eg, sex, age, marital status, 
education level, job position, income, chronic illness, 
inpatient care, healthcare provider type). Two models 
were applied for OOP healthcare expenditures. In the 
first model (model 1) the dependent variable was OOP 
expenditure for using healthcare from any provider, and 
in another model (model 2) the dependent variable was 
the OOP expenditure for using healthcare from MTP. 
The inpatient control variable was added only in the 
second part as all inpatient care incurred OOP healthcare 
expenditure and no variation with a participation deci-
sion. Preintervention and postintervention periods were 
included in the model as dummy variable, that is, time 
dummy (1=postintervention and 0=preintervention) for 
adjustment. The patients admitted to the inpatient care 
were often referred from the outpatient or emergency 
department of the health facility. We, therefore, classified 
these patients as ‘inpatient care users’, which was used as 
a control variable in the two- part regression model. Those 
who used only outpatient or emergency care were classi-
fied as ‘outpatient users’.
Patient and public involvement
Patients and the public were not involved in the design 
or planning of the study. Study findings will be shared 
with stakeholders, including owners association of the 
RMG factories, in meetings/seminars and in national or 
regional conferences.
rEsults
sample characteristics
Table 1 presents the socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of the study participants. The majority of 
the workers were 20–30 years old. The participants in 
IG and UG were mostly at the worker- level job position. 
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Table 1 Sample characteristics
Characteristics
Preintervention Postintervention
Insured group Uninsured group Insured group Uninsured group
% (95% CI) % (95% CI) % (95% CI) % (95% CI)
Age group (years)
<20 23.1 (19.3 to 26.9) 21.8 (18.1 to 25.5) 11.3 (8.4 to 14.1) 18.8 (15.3 to 22.3)
  20–30 49.2 (44.7 to 53.6) 62.2 (57.9 to 66.6) 54.1 (49.6 to 58.5) 58.0 (53.6 to 62.5)
  30–40 18.5 (15.1 to 22.0) 12.0 (9.1 to 14.9) 26.5 (22.6 to 0.5) 18.2 (14.7 to 1.6)
  40+ 9.2 (6.6 to 11.8) 3.9 (2.2 to 5.7) 8.1 (5.7 to 10.6) 5.0 (3.1 to 7.0)
Sex
  Male 40.6 (36.2 to 45.0) 52.5 (48.0 to 57.0) 31.3 (27.2 to 35.5) 47.8 (43.3 to 52.3)
  Female 59.4 (55.0 to 63.8) 47.5 (43.0 to 52.0) 68.7 (64.5 to 72.8) 52.2 (47.7 to 56.7)
Marital status
  Married 69.0 (64.8 to 73.1) 73.2 (69.3 to 77.2) 78.5 (74.8 to 82.2) 75.4 (71.5 to 79.2)
  Unmarried 27.1 (23.1 to 31.1) 24.5 (20.6 to 28.3) 18.4 (14.9 to 21.8) 22.8 (19.0 to 26.5)
  Others (widowed, divorced and 
separated)
4.0 (2.2 to 5.7) 2.3 (0.9 to 3.6) 3.1 (1.6 to 4.7) 1.9 (0.7 to 3.1)
Job position
  Worker 87.7 (84.8 to 90.6) 85.1 (81.9 to 88.2) 78.7 (75.0 to 82.4) 83.1 (79.7 to 86.5)
  Supervisor/admin- level worker 12.3 (9.4 to 15.2) 14.9 (11.8 to 18.1) 21.3 (17.6 to 25.0) 16.9 (13.5 to 20.3)
Household size
  3 persons or fewer 69.8 (65.7 to 73.9) 75.5 (71.7 to 79.4) 70.6 (66.5 to 74.6) 76.0 (72.2 to 79.8)
  4–5 persons 25.4 (21.5 to 29.3) 22.2 (18.5 to 25.9) 22.3 (18.6 to 26.1) 20.0 (16.5 to 23.6)
  6 persons or more 4.8 (2.9 to 6.7) 2.3 (0.9 to 3.6) 7.1 (4.8 to 9.4) 4.0 (2.2 to 5.7)
Level of education
  Primary level (years 1–5) 67.5 (63.3 to 71.7) 62.9 (58.5 to 67.2) 59.7 (55.3 to 64.1) 62.4 (58.1 to 66.8)
  Secondary level (years 9–10) 28.3 (24.3 to 32.4) 33.6 (29.4 to 37.8) 34.9 (30.6 to 39.1) 33.6 (29.4 to 37.8)
  Higher secondary level and above 
(years 11+)
4.2 (2.4 to 6.0) 3.5 (1.9 to 5.2) 5.4 (3.4 to 7.5) 4.0 (2.2 to 5.7)
Mean income per month 
(Bangladeshi taka)
7945 (7606 to 8284) 9140 (8737 to 9542) 12 945 (12 310 to 13 580) 11 298 (10 884 to 11 711)
The largest number of RMG workers had less than three 
household members. The workers mostly had primary 
level education. The average monthly income of UG 
workers (9140.0 BDT; US$176) was higher than IG 
workers (7945.0 BDT; US$102) in the preintervention 
period. However, in the postintervention period, there 
was no significant difference in monthly income between 
IG and UG.
Effect on healthcare utilisation
The effect of ESHI scheme on the utilisation of health-
care is presented in table 2. We found self- reported illness 
among the IG workers increased by 2.1% and among UG 
workers 0.8%. The DiD estimate showed that healthcare 
utilisation of MTPs (DiD=26.10.6; p<0.01) increased by 
about 26.0% among the IG workers compared to the UG 
workers as a result of the ESHI scheme. While accounting 
for covariates, the DiD estimate reduced to 18.4 and 
remained significant (p<0.05). However, after this adjust-
ment, healthcare- seeking among those who suffered from 
illness became significant (DiD=7.4; p<0.1). Among the 
three categories of providers, utilisation of healthcare 
from private providers was the highest in both IG and UG 
workers.
Effect on OOP healthcare payment
Table 3 summarises the OOP payments for healthcare 
of RMG workers in IG and UG. The descriptive statistics 
showed that at preintervention IG and UG spent 1197.7 
BDT or US$15.4 (CI 483.5 BDT to 1911.9 BDT) and 
817.8 BDT or US$10.5 (CI 531.2 BDT to 1104.4 BDT) 
for healthcare, respectively. It reduced to 951.3 BDT or 
US$12.2 (CI 567.5 BDT to 1335.1 BDT) among the IG 
workers and increased to 1681.1 BDT or US$21.6 (CI 
611.0 BDT to 2751.2 BDT) among the UG workers. In 
sum, the DiD estimate showed that the difference in OOP 
healthcare expenditure for any provider between IG and 
UG was not statistically significant. A similar result was 
observed for OOP spendings on healthcare utilisation of 
MTPs.
The results from the two- part regression model are 
presented in table 4. These models (models 4 and 5) 
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C
on
tin
ue
d
showed that the ESHI scheme has no effect on reduc-
tion of OOP healthcare expenditure for those seeking 
care from all types of providers or from MTPs. However, 
OOP expenditure for seeking healthcare from all types 
of providers was positively associated with inpatient care 
and chronic illness. For such care, female workers were 
spending less as OOP for healthcare compared with male 
workers. The supervisor/administrative staff spent less on 
healthcare than other workers. OOP expenditure due to 
utilisation of MTP was positively associated with inpatient 
care only.
DIsCussIOn
This study, based on representative surveys of preinterven-
tion and postintervention periods among RMG workers, 
is the first to consider the effect of the ESHI scheme on 
the utilisation of MTP in Bangladesh and on OOP expen-
diture. We found healthcare utilisation of MTPs signifi-
cantly increased among the insured compared with the 
uninsured workers (DiD=26.1; p<0.01). While accounting 
for the effects of covariates (eg, age, sex, education, 
marital status, household income, job position, and 
type of illness suffered), the DiD estimate changed to 
18.4 (p<0.05) and remained significant. Healthcare 
from MTP became more accessible to RMG workers 
when they enrolled in the ESHI scheme. Generally, the 
RMG workers have limited access to quality healthcare 
services. Therefore, increasing utilisation of MTPs was an 
important achievement of the ESHI scheme.15 However, 
we did not find any statistically significant effect of the 
ESHI scheme on the reduction of OOP healthcare 
expenditure. We found that RMG workers used health-
care providers or facilities (eg, drug sellers, traditional 
healers and private healthcare providers) which were 
not covered by the ESHI scheme. This might be due to 
their continued healthcare utilisation behaviour prior to 
enrolment in the insurance scheme. It has been observed 
in other studies that insured workers used healthcare 
from service providers those are not designated under 
their insurance schemes.33 Behaviour change commu-
nication intervention or educational intervention can 
be conducted among ESHI scheme members to inform 
them about the benefits of the scheme and the impor-
tance of using MTP.33 A standard treatment protocol was 
employed for the ESHI scheme to minimise supplier- 
induced healthcare utilisation. Further, the chances of 
overutilisation of healthcare services by RMG workers or 
moral hazard was limited since generally these workers 
significantly underuse healthcare services, as evidenced 
by other studies.15 16
Health insurance is warranted in many low- and- middle- 
income countries (LMICs) since reliance on OOP 
payments for healthcare services leads to catastrophic 
burden for many households. Approximately 4.2 million 
people are workers of the RMG industry in Bangladesh, 
however, the industry lacks adequate healthcare facilities 
for them.15 Health insurance for this specific group of 
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Table 4 Two- part regression analysis of out- of- pocket healthcare expenditure (natural logged) for seeking care from all types 
of providers and from MTPs
Characteristics Description
Model 1: seek care from all providers Model 2: seek care from MTPs
First stage
(participation logit 
equation)
Second stage 
(expenditure log 
regression)
First stage (participation 
logit equation)
Second stage 
(expenditure log 
regression)
OR
(95% CI)
Coefficient
(95% CI) OR (95% CI) Coefficient (95% CI)
Health insurance 
status
Insured (ref=matched 
uninsured)
1.276*** (1.131 to 
1.439)
−0.122
(−0.354 to 0.109)
0.889 (0.757 to 1.044) −0.143
(−0.556 to 0.270)
Time dummy Postintervention 
(ref=preintervention)
1.049
(0.919 to 1.197)
0.0173
(−0.238 to 0.273)
0.942 (0.792 to 1.121) 0.189
(−0.258 to 0.636)
Sex Male (ref=female) 0.770***
(0.67 to 0.884)
−0.294**
(−0.569 to 0.0192)
0.687*** (0.57 to 0.826) −0.262
(−0.771 to 0.247)
Age (years) 20–30 (ref=<20) 1.249**
(1.049 to 1.486)
0.146
(−0.186 to 0.477)
1.234* (0.969 to 1.571) 0.305
(−0.349 to 0.960)
30–40 (ref=<20) 1.083
(0.865 to 1.355)
0.332
(−0.0971 to 0.761)
1.226 (0.909 to 1.654) −0.0261
(−0.811 to 0.759)
40+ (ref=<20) 1.157
(0.863 to 1.55)
0.164
(−0.399 to 0.727)
1.108 (0.74 to 1.659) 0.334
(−0.775 to 1.443)
Marital status Married (ref=unmarried) 1.068
(0.908 to 1.255)
0.168
(−0.147 to 0.484)
1.225* (0.974 to 1.54) −0.223
(−0.861 to 0.415)
Others (ref=unmarried) 1.251
(0.855 to 1.833)
−0.113
(−0.790 to 0.564)
1.415 (0.879 to 2.275) −0.953
(−2.135 to 0.229)
Education Secondary (ref=primary) 1.206**
(1.037 to 1.401)
0.0323
(−0.258 to 0.322)
1.106 (0.905 to 1.354) −0.0412
(−0.566 to 0.483)
Higher secondary and 
above (ref=primary)
1.020
(0.737 to 1.411)
−0.197
(−0.871 to 0.477)
1.066 (0.699 to 1.626) 0.0805
(−1.036 to 1.197)
Job position Supervisor/admin- level 
worker (ref=other worker)
1.038
(0.862 to 1.251)
−0.302* (−0.656 to 0.0528) 1.086 (0.852 to 1.384) −0.160
(−0.783 to 0.463)
Income Logged income per month 0.78***
(0.649 to 0.939)
0.246
(−0.111 to 0.603)
1.225 (0.959 to 1.565) −0.0365
(−0.742 to 0.669)
Chronic illness Suffered chronic illness 
(ref=other illness)
5.244*** (2.784 to 
9.875)
0.699** (0.127 to 1.272) 2.886*** (1.804 to 4.618) 0.540
(−0.306 to 1.386)
Inpatient care Sought inpatient care
(ref=outpatient care)
– 1.717*** (1.160 to 2.274) – 2.071***
(1.335 to 2.807)
Healthcare 
provider
Private (ref=public) – −1.013***
(−1.635 to 0.390)
– –
Others (ref=public) – −0.344
(−1.172 to 0.484)
– –
Constant 4.816*
(0.952 to 24.337)
4.360*** (1.155 to 7.566) 0.039*** (0.004 to 0.334) 7.094** (0.880 to 13.31)
n   1924 658 1924 199
Pseudo- R- squared/adjusted R- squared 0.070 0.099 0.07 0.119
*P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01.
MTPs, medically trained providers; OOP, out- of- pocket; ref, reference.
RMG workers can increase healthcare accessibility and 
utilisation at an affordable price.34 35
The findings from this study were similar to a number 
of studies that have examined the effects of health insur-
ance/micro- health insurance schemes on healthcare util-
isation and financial outcomes among members.22 36–40 
Four studies have found higher utilisation of healthcare 
services among the insured individuals in different settings 
such as Congo,41 Senegal,42 India43 and Philippines.22 36 In 
addition, Hamid et al44 found that micro- health insurance 
improves the health status of insured members, which 
increases productivity and labour supply. Such positive 
effects of the studied ESHI scheme on utilisation may also 
increase the production of RMG sectors. However, the 
International Labour Organization found that only 14 
out of 24 studies that examined the healthcare utilisation 
effects of health insurance observed positive outcomes.40 
Jakab and Krishnan,45 in a review, showed that 13 out of 
16 studies reported that the insured members were likely 
to use more healthcare services than non- members; 2 
studies found no difference while 1 study found a slight 
decrease in healthcare use. Another study conducted 
by Raza et al46 on community- based health insurance in 
India reported that the health insurance scheme had no 
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significant effect on any utilisation outcome and there was 
no significant evidence of reducing financial hardship.
The statistically non- significant effect of the ESHI 
scheme on reducing OOP healthcare expenditure could 
be explained by the healthcare- seeking behaviour of 
the insured workers. We observed that a proportion of 
the insured workers continued to use health services 
from formal and informal providers (drug store, tradi-
tional healers and so on) out of the scheme at their own 
payments, despite their access to providers designated 
by the insurance scheme at no cost. Consequently, OOP 
payments of the insured workers remained high. Such 
healthcare- seeking behaviour of workers during their 
first and 1 year of enrolment might have influenced our 
findings considerably. Our study did not analyse the 
health outcomes of the enrollees in this study and was 
limited within the investigation of healthcare utilisation 
and OOP payment. It, therefore, might be useful to note 
here that the utilisation of informal care providers by 
insured workers might have contributed to their health 
outcome. The impact of health insurance on health 
outcomes should be studied to better estimate and 
understand the value for money of such interventions. 
We, however, believe that an educational intervention on 
health- seeking behaviour and financial literacy of workers 
and their enrolment in the scheme for a longer period 
might be useful in changing their behaviour towards util-
isation of healthcare providers designated by the insur-
ance scheme. We found the average OOP payments of 
RMG workers were 1329.4 BDT and 3567.7 BDT in UG 
and IG, respectively in preintervention period. Khan et 
al47 estimated that the OOP payment of Bangladeshis 
was 644.6 BDT for 30 days (or 1933.8 BDT for 3 months) 
using nationwide household income expenditure survey 
of 2010. Although this estimate was not directly compa-
rable with our estimate due to the difference in study 
population, the average OOP spending we estimated for 
a 3- month period was more or less similar.
The limited maximum coverage, that is, 15 000 BDT per 
year per worker, by the insurance scheme might not be 
adequate to cover the OOP healthcare expenditure of the 
scheme enrollees. However, this low maximum coverage 
per member per year was kept to secure the scheme’s finan-
cial sustainability, especially during the pilot phase where 
prior knowledge about the expenditure of health insurance 
schemes was limited in Bangladesh in general and for RMG 
workers in particular.48 The insurance scheme management 
should revise this annual ceiling amount to meet the high 
cost of treatment (eg, multiple inpatient care utilisation) 
based on the experience of this pilot phase. Another limita-
tion of the ESHI scheme was that the scheme contracted 
a few healthcare facilities that may affect the healthcare- 
seeking behaviour of the insured RMG workers. We found 
a number of RMG workers were using healthcare services 
from drug sellers and traditional providers while they are 
covered by the scheme, and this may obscure the effect of 
this scheme on reducing the OOP healthcare expenditure. 
The scheme management can include more healthcare 
service delivery points based on the opinion of the RMG 
workers. The initiative should be taken by the scheme 
manager to better inform the RMG workers about the avail-
able services under the ESHI scheme and motivate them 
to use such services. This scheme has potential to be scaled 
up in the existing RMG factories and other industries in 
Bangladesh. The political will of the government and the 
willingness of the RMG factory owners will be fundamental 
to the large- scale implementation of ESHI schemes and 
their sustainability. However, before the scale- up of the 
scheme, financial sustainability should be tested, and this 
was beyond the scope of the current study.
One possible limitation of the study is that we were unable 
to follow up the same workers during the preintervention 
and postintervention period. This was not possible due to 
the high dropout rate of RMG workers. However, RMG 
workers were randomly selected from the list of workers for 
both IG and UG in the preintervention and postinterven-
tion period, and no significant difference was observed in 
the demographic characteristics of the workers (table 1). 
Another limitation was that the ESHI scheme was imple-
mented for a 1- year period, which may be a short time to 
assess the OOP healthcare expenditure effect of this scheme. 
Several studies reported findings without preintervention 
to assess the utilisation effect of health insurance.22 37 43 49 
However, this study used a pre–post intervention design 
considering two groups that provide an opportunity to 
obtain DiD estimates, which is a standard approach to assess 
the effects of any intervention.25 There are possibilities of 
recall bias and bias on self- reported information about 
illness, healthcare utilisation and OOP healthcare expendi-
ture among RMG workers who have poor knowledge about 
medical conditions and healthcare services.50 51 However, 
we used a 90- day recall period to minimise such biases. We 
were unable to test the parallel trend assumption of the DiD 
approach in this study. We did not include a midline survey 
in this evaluation study considering the short period of the 
ESHI pilot scheme (1 year) and the budgetary constraint 
for data collection, and are thus potential limitations of this 
study.
COnClusIOns
The ESHI scheme had a significant effect on increasing 
healthcare utilisation of MTPs and a non- significant effect 
on reduction in the OOP healthcare expenditure. Educa-
tional intervention on healthcare- seeking behaviour and 
related financial literacy can be recommended to increase 
RMG workers’ utilisation of healthcare services provided 
by insurance scheme- designated healthcare providers, 
which consequently would reduce OOP payments. The 
employers, therefore, should promote ESHI scheme 
to RMG workers to address the challenge of UHC. For 
better understanding the value for money, future studies 
on the impact of the ESHI scheme on health outcomes 
are required.
This kind of scheme can generate new resources for 
providing healthcare to low- income RMG workers in 
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LMICs through employer contribution. The healthcare 
financing strategy of the government of Bangladesh 
as well as the WHO should prioritise such schemes for 
workers.11 52 This study contributes to the concept of initi-
ating such schemes at a broader scale and informing poli-
cymakers on the key issues to consider while designing 
such schemes in the future.
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